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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Does the plain language waiver of sovereign immunity in
section 118 of the federal Clean Air Act subject the Depart-
ment of Interior to liability for state civil penalties imposed in
response to persistent violations of a state's Clean Air Act.
2. Is judicial review of a federal agency's voluntarily pre-
pared Environmental Impact Statement precluded by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, in a case in which the National
Environmental Policy Act does not require the preparation of
that document because of the agency's unchallenged finding
that its proposed project would have no significant impact on
the human environment.
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OPINION BELOW
The United States District Court for the District of New
Union concluded that the Department of Interior's Coal Re-
search Activity was liable for civil penalties assessed under
the New Union Clean Air Act because the federal Clean Air
Act, section 118, contains a "clear and unambiguous" waiver
of sovereign immunity.
The District Court also found that the Environmental
Impact Statement prepared by CRACT was subject to judicial
review, despite CRACT's voluntary preparation of that
document.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Twenty percent of the workforce of the state of New Union
works in the Coal industry. (R. at 2.) Of these, 800 are em-
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ployed at the Department of the Interior's Coal Research Ac-
tivity (CRACT) facility in Cathertown, New Union. Id. The
CRACT facility researches all aspects of the coal process. Id.
The facility includes a coal mine, a transportation yard and a
coal furnace. Id. CRACT shares its research with the coal
industry. Id. CRACT began the Improved Coal Transport Ex-
periment ("ICTE") in April 1985. Id. at 3. The ICTE program
tests a new process to pack coal into barrels for shipping. Id.
The process heats the coal to 400 degrees and then pulverizes
the coal. Id. Workers can then pour the coal into barrels
without wasting air space. Id. The ICTE process creates a
large quantity of particulate matter which escapes into the
air. Id. On September 30, 1989, the New Union Department
of Environmental Quality (NUIDEQ) inspected the CRACT fa-
cility and cited CRACT for violating the New Union Clean Air
Act("NUCAA"), a state program authorized under the federal
Clean Air Act. Id. The NUDEQ Administrator wrote CRACT
explaining the NUCAA standards and asserting jurisdiction
to regulate the facility. Id. Despite receiving notice that
ICTE violated NUCAA standards, CRACT made no change in
its ICTE program. Id. On April 27, 1993, NUJDEQ inspectors
again visited the CRACT facility. Id. Because CRACT had
not complied with the previous citation, the NUDEQ Admin-
istrator imposed $300,000 in civil penalties. Id.
CRACT admitted that the facility has an obligation to
comply with the substantive provisions of NUCAA. Id.
CRACT informed NUDEQ that CRACT would build a hangar
and baghouse to trap particulate matter before the air is
filtered outside. Id. All parties agree that the proposed han-
gar and baghouse will bring ICTE into compliance with NU-
CAA. Id.
Although CRACT admits that the facility was obligated
to meet NUCAA standards, it claims sovereign immunity
prevents NUDEQ from assessing civil penalties against
CRACT for past violations. Id. The state of New Union
therefore filed suit to enforce the $300,000 penalty. Id.
After CRACT decided to build the hangar and baghouse
to bring the ICTE project into compliance with NUCAA stan-
dards, environmental groups became interested in the pro-
1995] 715
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ject. Id. Sunpeace, one such group, is a non-profit
organization which encourages solar energy research. Id. at
2. Sunpeace claims the coal industry pollutes the air and con-
tributes to global warming. Id. Sunpeace began a media
campaign criticizing the ICTE program and urging the
CRACT facility be shut down. Id.
On June 26, 1993, CRACT published a Finding of No Sig-
nificant Impact (FONSI), concluding the baghouse would not
significantly impact the human environment. Id. at 4. Sun-
peace failed to challenge the adequacy of the FONSI. Id.
Thereafter, CRACT decided to voluntarily prepare an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement under expedited procedures.
Id.
CRACT published the Draft EIS in December 1993 set-
ting forth two alternatives: (1) construction of the hangar
and baghouse; and (2) operation of ICTE at a reduced volume
so as to meet the NUCAA standards. Id. Written comments
were submitted by Sunpeace asserting another alternative,
that of no ICTE program at all. Id. Sunpeace claimed discon-
tinuance of ICTE was the "no action" alternative required by
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Id. CRACT
responded that the alternative of discontinuing ICTE was be-
yond -the scope of the EIS and did not include the alternative
in the final EIS. Id. In the Final EIS, CRACT selected the
hangar and baghouse alternative. Id.
Sunpeace filed suit against CRACT, claiming the EIS is
inadequate for failing to discuss shutting down the ICTE pro-
gram. Id. Sunpeace sought review under NEPA and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. Id. The court below consolidated
the action brought by Sunpeace with the action brought by
New Union. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Stubborn adherence to the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity cannot be justified in the face of a clear congressional
waiver of that antiquated doctrine. Such a waiver is clearly
stated by the plain language of the Federal Clean Air Act. In
addition to the plain language of the Act, Congress created
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/5
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compelling evidence that documents its absolute intent to
waive sovereign immunity to the type of state penalty which
New Union properly assessed against CRACT. This evidence
is amply recorded in the legislative history of the Clean Air
Act, and is corroborated by the public policy underlying the
entire Act.
The plain language of the Federal Clean Air Act unam-
biguously waives any claim to sovereign immunity which
CRACT might otherwise enjoy. Section 118 of that Act, the
Federal Facilities provision, expressly waives CRACT's sover-
eign immunity to any and all of the civil penalties New Union
properly assessed in response to CRACT's knowing, willful,
and persistent state law violations. The clarity of the section
118 waiver is further bolstered by the clear intent of section
304 of the Clean Air Act, the Citizen's Suit provision, author-
izing New Union to sue CRACT for recovery of civil penalties
assessed under the New Union Clean Air Act.
It is difficult to imagine how the legislative history of the
1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act could more clearly
express Congress' intent to waive sovereign immunity for fa-
cilities such as CRACT. First, the House committee drafting
the Amendments completely rejected its own subcommittee's
attempt to limit the broad waiver of immunity which ulti-
mately became law. Second, the Conference Committee
clearly chose the broad waiver of immunity granted by the
House version of the Amendments over the narrow waiver of
immunity included in the Senate's version. The Conference
Committee's adoption of the House version's broad waiver
should eliminate any suspicion about Congress' clear intent.
This legislative history thus bolsters the plain language of
the Clean Air Act's express waiver of sovereign immunity for
facilities engaging in the very type of violations committed by
CRACT.
Public policy also militates in favor of honoring Congress'
broad waiver of federal sovereign immunity. Congress rea-
sonably and explicitly chose to hold the budgetary feet of fed-
eral agencies to the fire of state air quality law penalties.
This policy forces malfeasant federal bureaucracies, which
have a history of mere grudging compliance with environ-
1995] 717
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mental laws, to not only endure budget losses from state pen-
alties, but also the bright light of the Congressional attention
ensured by such budget losses.
The Environmental Impact Statement prepared by
CRACT is not subject to judicial review for compliance with
the National Environmental Policy Act. CRACT completely
fulfilled its NEPA requirements by properly issuing a Find-
ing of No Significant Impact on its proposal to build a hangar
and baghouse for the Improved Coal Transport Experiment.
After fulfilling its NEPA requirements, CRACT voluntarily
chose to prepare an EIS to inform the public more fully. This
EIS is not subject to judicial review, because its preparation
was a voluntary agency action entirely outside the scope of
NEPA. Such discretionary agency actions are beyond the
reach of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act.
Even if the voluntary EIS prepared by CRACT were re-
viewable for compliance with NEPA, the record clearly shows
that CRACT took a "hard look" at all reasonable alternatives.
The EIS prepared by CRACT satisfies all NEPA require-
ments, because NEPA only requires that CRACT consider al-
ternatives reasonably related to the purposes of the hangar
and baghouse construction project. The alternative of shut-
ting down ICTE, now urged by Sunpeace, is clearly beyond
the scope of CRACT's proposed construction project, and is
therefore not an EIS alternative NEPA would require. Even
if shutting down ICTE were not outside the scope of the
agency's proposed project, it would still be an unreasonable
alternative. This is true because the policy decision to make
a huge human and economic investment in CRACT and the
ICTE program is not judicially reviewable, and that policy
predates this action by a number of years. Finally, even if
shutting down ICTE were a reasonable alternative, and even
if that alternative fell within the scope of the proposed han-
gar and baghouse project, the Court should uphold CRACT's
decision to omit shutting down ICTE, because that decision
was not arbitrary and capricious.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/5
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ARGUMENT
I. NEW UNION'S ASSESSMENT OF PUNITIVE CIVIL
PENALTIES AGAINST CRACT IS AUTHORIZED BY
THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
PROVIDED BY THE TEXT, LEGISLATIVE INTENT
AND PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FEDERAL CLEAN
AIR ACT.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was first introduced
into the federal common law of this country in 1819. McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). While at
least partly rooted in the antiquated notion that the 'king
could do no wrong,' the doctrine's contemporary justification
is ostensibly the prevention of undue interference in govern-
ment from lawsuits brought by non-governmental entities.
Unfortunately, sovereign immunity is a substantial ob-
stacle to both substantive and procedural justice, preventing
courts from stopping illegal government actions that they
would be competent to prohibit among private parties. With
no foundation in the Constitution, sovereign immunity ap-
pears to be primarily supported by the "four-horse team so
often encountered__historical accident, habit, a natural ten-
dency to favor the familiar, and inertia." Kenneth C. Davis,
Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 Admin. L. Rev. 383 (1970).
Recognizing the fundamental inequity of sovereign im-
munity, Congress has worked diligently to reform the doc-
trine for the past two decades. This effort has yielded the
1976 amendments to the Administrative Procedures Act and
1977 amendments to certain federal environmental statutes,
including the Clean Air Act.
The 1977 Clean Air Act amendments were expressly
designed to overturn the expansive interpretation of Clean
Air Act sovereign immunity set forth by the Supreme Court
in Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976). This design is
clearly manifested in the language, history, and policy of the
1977 Clean Air Act amendments, through which Congress
unequivocally waived federal sovereign immunity to punitive
administrative penalties assessed against federal facilities
such as CRACT.
1995] 719
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A. The text of the Federal Clean Air Act ("CAA") provides a
"clear and unambiguous" waiver of sovereign
immunity from administrative civil penalties
assessed against CRACT for past violations of
New Union's federally-approved clean air act program.
It is well settled that the United States, as sovereign, is
immune from suit in the absence of its consent to suit. Li-
brary of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 (1986). Any
waiver of that immunity "cannot be implied but must be un-
equivocally expressed by Congress." United States v. Testan,
424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). New Union does not dispute these
principles, but asserts that the plain language of the CAA,
under which authority New Union administers its own clean
air legislation, clearly expresses the will and intent of Con-
gress to waive the federal government's immunity to the ad-
ministrative fines that New Union properly imposed against
CRACT.
1. As amended in 1977, the Federal Facilities
provision of the Clean Air Act, section 118,
expressly waives the sovereign immunity of
federal facilities against administrative civil
penalties.
In Hancock v. Train, the United States Supreme Court
found a lack of evidence that Congress intended the CAA to
give the states power to force federal compliance with CAA
emission standards, even though Congress did intend for fed-
eral facilities to meet CAA standards in substance. 426 U.S.
at 185-86 (emphasis added). Congress promptly responded
by amending the CAA "to overturn the Hancock case, and to
express with sufficient clarity, the committee's desire to sub-
ject Federal facilities to all Federal, State, and local require-
ments-procedural, substantive, or otherwise-process and
sanctions." H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 199, re-
printed in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1278.
The 'federal facilities' provision of the 1977 CAA Amend-
ments provides, in relevant part:
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/5
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Each department... of the Federal government.., shall
be subject to, and comply with all Federal, State, interstate
and local requirements, administrative authority, and pro-
cess and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of
air pollution in the same manner and to the same extent as
any nongovernmental entity. The preceding sentence
shall apply ... (c) to any process and sanction, whether
enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any other
manner. This subsection shall apply notwithstanding any
immunity of such agencies... under any law or rule of
law. No officer, agent, or employee of the United States
shall be personally liable for any civil penalty under this
title.
42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1988).
The broad language of the above provision leaves no
doubt as to the extent of the waiver Congress intended. This
provision expressly subjects federal facilities such as CRACT
"to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity" to "all
... State... requirements, administrative authority, and...
any process and sanction,... notwithstanding any immunity
• ..under any law or rule of law." Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, this amended version of CAA section 118 contains nu-
merous words of inclusion which the Court found lacking in
the 1970 version of the CAA considered in Hancock. 426 U.S.
at 182.
In defending itself against civil administrative penalties
in the past, the federal government has asserted that the
term "sanctions" in the federal facilities provisions of various
environmental statutes refers only to penalties imposed to
enforce injunctive relief ordered by a court. See United States
Dep't. of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1636, 1640 (1992)
(Clean Water Act ("CWA") and Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA")); Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421,
1425, 1428 (10th Cir. 1990) (CWA and CAA); Ohio v. United
States Dept. of the Air Force, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
21210 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1987) (CAA).
Such an interpretation, however, is not supported by the
language of the statute. According to the current legal defini-
tion, a sanction is "[t]hat part of a law which is designed to
1995] 721
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secure enforcement by imposing a penalty for its violation or
offering a reward for its observance." Black's Law Dictionary
1341 (6th ed. 1990). Given this legal definition, it is incon-
ceivable that the word "sanction" would not encompass ad-
ministrative civil penalties under a statute which subjects
the federal government to all and any sanctions, however en-
forced, to the same extent as any other entity.
In Ohio v. Air Force, the district court found that the
common usage of the term "sanctions" included penalties and
fines, as well as court-ordered injunctive relief. 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. at 21213. The Sierra Club court similarly concluded the
term sanctions clearly encompassed civil penalties imposed
for punitive as well as coercive purposes. 931 F.2d at 1425,
1428.
In Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that Congress did not intend to allow administrative
civil penalties against the United States under sanction-au-
thorizing provisions of RCRA and the CWA; this determina-
tion is not applicable to the CAA, however. The relevant
language of RCRA, as worded in 1992, was textually distin-
guishable from section 118 of the CAA, and could have argua-
bly limited the phrase "process and sanctions" to only those
sanctions required to enforce injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6961 (Supp. II 1990). No such textual limitation exists in
the CAA.
The federal facilities provision of the CWA is admittedly
more similar to section 118 of the CAA than was the RCRA
provision considered by the Court. The Court's refusal to find
a waiver of sovereign immunity as to punitive penalties in
the CWA turned, however, on an extremely narrow interpre-
tation of the term "sanctions," coupled with reliance on the
CWA's unique requirement that civil penalties either "arise
under Federal law" or be imposed to enforce an order of a
state or local court.' 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982).
1. It should be noted that Justice White, writing for a three-justice dissent
in DOE v. Ohio, was highly critical of the majority's "tortured discussion" of the
meaning of sanctions. 112 S. Ct. at 1641 (White, J., dissenting). According to
Justice White, the plain language of the CWA, taken as a whole, clearly exposed
the United States to liability for civil penalties. Immediately after DOE v.
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The CAA does not stop at merely implicating a waiver of
sovereign immunity through the use of broad words and
phrases like "any process and sanction." Congress was obvi-
ously desirous of ensuring no further judicial misunderstand-
ings when it added the final words of subsection (a)(1)(C):
"[tlhis subsection shall apply notwithstanding any immunity
of such agencies, officers, agents, or employees under any law
or rule of law. No officer, agent, or employee of the United
States shall be personally liable for any civil penalty under
this title." (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a)(1)(C). With
these sentences, Congress unequivocally stripped away all
possible immunities of all governmental actors, including
agencies. Congress then explicitly exempted certain individ-
uals, but not agencies, from one type of applicable sanction,
civil penalties.
Traditional rules of statutory construction counsel
against constructions which render words or phrases of a
statute meaningless. See California v. United States Dep't of
the Navy, 845 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1988). Unless authori-
zation for assessing civil penalties against the federal govern-
ment exists by virtue of the language of section 118, there
could be no possible need to exempt certain governmental ac-
tors from those penalties, and the words of exemption would
be meaningless.
Furthermore, a statutory provision should be given no
construction which renders meaningless the goals of the leg-
islation when taken as a whole. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks On
the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395
(1950). The express intent of the CAA federal facilities provi-
sion, that federal and private violators be treated alike,
would be frustrated if governmental entities were exempt
Ohio, Congress passed the Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992, amending
RCRA to more clearly express such an intent. Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat.
1505 (1992). The Federal Facilities Clean Water Compliance Act, an amend-
ment to the CWA for the same purpose, is currently pending in Congress in
response to that "infamous decision" in DOE v. Ohio. 139 Cong. Rec. E1720
(daily ed. July 1, 1993)(statement of Rep. DeFazio).
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from civil penalties, one of the most commonly used state en-
forcement tools.
Additionally, if the Clean Air Act does not authorize civil
penalties against the federal government, arguably the na-
tion's worst polluter,2 it would significantly hinder the 1977
CAA Amendments' goals to "provide greater assistance for
State and local governments in the administration of the
Clean Air Act," and "to provide more effective... enforcement
tools for States... to bring existing stationary and mobile
sources into compliance and to assure that they remain in
compliance." H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, re-
printed in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1079.
The federal government itself demonstrated an under-
standing that the language of the Clean Air Act's amended
section 118 waives sovereign immunity from administra-
tively imposed sanctions levied by local air pollution control
authorities. Matter of: Nat. Oceanic & Atmospheric Agency
Payment of Civil Penalty for Violation of Local Air Quality
Standards, Op. Comptroller Gen. No. B-191747, 1978 WL
9814 (June 6, 1978). In a 1978 opinion, the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the General Accounting Office advised the Justice De-
partment that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration was liable, under the 1977 Amendment to
section 118, for a civil penalty imposed by the Puget Sound
Air Pollution Control Agency for a violation of local air qual-
ity standards. Id. at *1. According to the Comptroller Gen-
eral, this penalty was payable from the agency
appropriations of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency. Id. at *3.
The federal district court in Alabama v. Veterans Ad-
min., 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986), provided a cogent
2. As of 1988, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that over 2300
federally-owned facilities handled, contained, or generated hazardous waste
materials. Thousands of these sites were then known or suspected of noncom-
pliance with applicable federal, state, or local requirements. See Cleanup at
Federal Facilities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transportation, Tourism,
and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 338 (1988).
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summary of the Congressional intent expressed within the
text of the CAA:
Given that the statutory sections in question expressly
provide that the United States and its agencies shall be
subject to suit and that all federal facilities must comply
with all state air pollution regulations and that those pro-
visions shall apply notwithstanding any immunity of such
agencies, Congress' intention to waive sovereign immunity
could not be more clearly established.
Id. at 1211.
2. The Citizen's Suit provision of the Clean Air Act,
section 304, also authorizes New Union's suit for
civil penalties against CRACT.
Section 304 of the CAA, the citizen suit provision of the
statute, authorizes "any person" to commence a civil action
"against any person (including (i)the United States)." 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1988). Section 302 of the CAA, the gen-
eral definitions provision, specifically designates individual
states, as well the United States and its agencies, as "per-
sons" under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e). Furthermore, the
1977 Amendment to section 304 added that:
Nothing in this section or in any other law of the United
States shall be construed to prohibit, exclude or restrict
any State... from... (2) bringing any administrative ac-
tion or obtaining any administrative remedy or sanction in
any State or local administrative agency, department or in-
strumentality, against the United States, any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof... under State or local
law respecting control and abatement of air pollution. For
provisions requiring compliance by the United States... in
the same manner as nongovernmental entities, see section
118.
42 U.S.C. § 7604(e)(emphasis added).
This latter phrase links the state's-right to sue under sec-
tion 304 with its authority to assess any sanction in section
118 as discussed above. In its 1978 National Oceanic and At-
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mospheric Agency opinion, cited previously, the Comptroller
General noted that "Congress specifically provided for the lia-
bility of federal agencies to pay civil penalties administra-
tively imposed by the states when it ... amended section
304(e) of the Clean Air Act." 1978 WL 9814 (C.G.) at *2.
In 1986, the Alabama v. Veterans Admin. court also ac-
knowledged the availability of civil penalties in citizen suits
brought by states against federal agencies. 648 F. Supp. at
1211. Significantly, the district court in the present action
read section 118 in conjunction with section 304 to find a
clear and unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity in the
CAA. (R. at 5.)
Such interpretations are not only textually justified, but
also conform to the purposes of the Act as a whole. If citizen
suits are to provide effective deterrence against pollution vio-
lations, as they are intended, they must implicate civil penal-
ties. Otherwise, such suits would provide little incentive for
polluters to comply with standards until the suit was actually
commenced. Unless section 304 authorizes citizens to sue for
civil penalties against the United States, agency violations
will not be deterred.
B. The legislative history of the 1977 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act clearly expresses Congress' intent that
the Act waive Federal sovereign immunity from
administrative civil penalties.
When Congress clearly waives sovereign immunity, the
judiciary must not thwart Congress' intent by applying an
"unduly restrictive interpretation" to such a waiver. Cana-
dian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 222 (1945).
When determining the existence and scope of a waiver, the
controlling factor should be "underlying Congressional pol-
icy." Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467
U.S. 512, 521 (1984). Fortunately, the Congressional policy
underlying the 1977 Amendments to the CAA is explicit
within the legislative history of those Amendments.
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In their report to Congress concerning the proposed
amendment to section 118, House committee members
stated:
The applicable sanctions are to be the same for Federal fa-
cilities and personnel as for privately owned pollution
sources .... This means that Federal facilities and agen-
cies may be subject to injunctive relief (and criminal or
civil contempt citations to enforce any such injunction), to
civil or criminal penalties, and to delayed compliance
penalties.
H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 200, reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1279. The House's version of section 118
was subsequently adopted by the conference committee and
signed into law. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, s 113, 91
Stat. 685, 711 (1977).
Even if the language of the committee report were not
clear, the history behind the House-Senate compromise to
craft a single provision further proves that Congress intended
that the final version waive federal immunity from civil pen-
alties. The House subcommittee bill introduced in 1975 by
Rep. Paul Rogers would have excluded criminal or civil penal-
ties from the sanctions section 118 would have allowed
against the United States. H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 113 (1975). Six months later, however, when this bill
reemerged from the full committee, the explicit criminal or
civil penalty immunity of the subcommittee version was gone,
replaced by the phrase "[n]either the United States nor any
officer, agent or employee thereof shall be immune or exempt
from any process or sanction of any State or Federal court
with respect to the enforcement of any such requirement."
H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 113 (1976).
In 1977, a Senate bill appeared with much the same lim-
ited waiver as Rep. Rogers' earlier bill. S. 252, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 14, reprinted in S. Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 177-78 (1977). This bill was not adopted, however;
rather, it was the wording from the 1977 House bill making
federal facilities subject "to any process and sanction,
whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any
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other manner," and "notwithstanding any immunity ...
under any law or rule of law" that ultimately became part of
the 1977 Amendments to the CAA. H.R. 6161, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 113, reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 294, 363 (1977).
The Conference committee's acceptance of the House
bill's broad waiver, in the face of the more narrow alternative
in the Senate bill, removes any suspicion that the waiver
mandated in the plain language of 118 could have been inad-
vertent or unintended. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 830, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 93 (1977).
Courts have relied on this legislative history in finding
that the text of the CAA means exactly what it says. The
Alabama v. Veterans Admin. court cited H. Rep. 294 in decid-
ing that "Congress' intention to waive sovereign immunity
could not be more clearly established." 648 F. Supp. at 1211.
The Ohio v. Air Force court discussed both the House and
Senate bills, and noted the Conference agreement statement
that "[t]he conferees intend, by adopting the House amend-
ment, to require compliance with all procedural and substan-
tive requirements, to authorize States to sue Federal
facilities in State courts, and to subject such facilities to State
sanctions." 17 Envtl. L. Rep. at 21213 (citing H.R. Rep. No.
294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 137 reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1518).
Similarly, the 10th Circuit, in Sierra Club, agreed with
the district court that the language of the House report on the
CAA "indicates Congress' intent to waive the United States
immunity for civil penalties." 931 F. 2d at 1428 (citing Sierra
Club v. Lujan, 728 F. Supp. 1513, 1517 (D. Colo. 1990)). Even
the Comptroller General noted the House report's specific ref-
erence to civil penalties in his opinion that the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency was liable to the Puget
Sound Air Pollution Control Authority for administrative
civil penalties. 1978 WL 9814 (C.G.) at *1. Finally, the dis-
trict court in the present case also found that the legislative
history was instructive of Congressional intent to authorize
the penalties New Union requests. (R. at 5.)
In 1949, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "'[t]he
exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship
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enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add
to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has
been announced.'" United States v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949)(quoting Anderson v.
John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (N.Y.
1926)(Cardozo, J.)). This is an especially important principle
in cases involving violations of environmental legislation by
the federal government, where the scope of the problem
reaches national proportions, and insistence on the continued
existence of a broad waiver renders environmental statutes
incapable of achieving their intended goals.
C. Public policy militates in favor of recognizing the broad
waiver of federal sovereign immunity expressed by the
plain language of section 118 and recorded in its
legislative history.
Deterrence of violations is the primary reason for sub-
jecting federal facilities such as CRACT to civil penalties
under environmental statutes. Imposition of civil penalties
can put Congress on notice of the penalized agency's miscon-
duct, immediately focusing Congressional attention on an
otherwise obscure federal entity. This is true despite the fact
that civil fines paid by agencies usually travel to the coffers of
the federal treasury, not the coffers of the state imposing the
penalty. See Michael D. Axline et. al., Stones For David's
Sling: Civil Penalties in Citizen Suits Against Polluting Fed-
eral Facilities, 2 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 1, 41 (1987).
Federal agencies, like all bureaucracies, are highly pro-
tective of their budgets. If money damages must be paid out
of an agency's own appropriations, the agency will suffer a
shortfall in operating funds which will almost certainly come
to the attention of Congress when additional appropriations
are requested by the agency. If the money comes from the
General Accounting Office, an alternative for paying such
penalties under certain circumstances, Congress' own budg-
etary oversight agency will be forced to go through the pro-
cess of justifying expenditures for civil penalties, a process
which will of necessity involve both the House and Senate in
its annual Budget Resolution and Reconciliation process. As
1995] 729
23
730 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
Congress becomes painfully aware of the government's mal-
feasance, it will pressure offenders to improve their perform-
ance. Id.
Congress is well aware of the value of fines and penalties
as an enforcement tool for national environmental statutes.
In 1990, EPA officials testified before the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works that "penalties serve as a
valuable deterrent to noncompliance and to help focus facility
managers attention on the importance of compliance with en-
vironmental requirements." S. Rep. 101-553, 101st Cong.,
2nd Sess. 4 (1990). The Committee also received testimony of
state officials from 40 states that civil penalties are necessary
to ensure compliance with environmental requirements by
federal facilities. Id. at 5.
The availability of civil penalties would have the added
benefit of preventing compliance delays. Unlike litigation for
injunctive relief, state-imposed administrative penalties ac-
crue from the date of assessment, and there is no advantage
to long, drawn-out legal procedures. See Cong. Budget Office,
Federal Liabilities Under Hazardous Waste Laws, S. Doc. No.
95, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 25 (1990). In fact, the availability
of such penalties would likely encourage settlements between
citizens and federal agencies. Axline, 2 J. Envtl. L. & Litig.
at 43. Not only are civil penalties a potent deterrent of ongo-ing illegal conduct by agencies threatened with a citizen suit,
they serve as an example and warning to others as well. Id.
at 44.
Cleanup of federal facilities has already cost the federal
government billions of dollars. Cleanup at Federal Facilities:
Hearings on H.R. 765 Before the Subcomm. on Transp. &
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1989). Despite this, fed-
eral facilities have repeatedly demonstrated their unwilling-
nes to voluntarily comply with the nation's environmental
laws, as was the case with CRACT's willful and knowing vio-
lation of NUCAA for over two and one-half years. (R. at 3.)
Without real power to compel environmental compliance
and prevent future violations within its borders by CRACT
and other federal facilities, New Union simply cannot make
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its environmental protection programs work. To support the
efforts of state governments in providing a safer, cleaner
world for their citizens, Congress' labored mightily to provide
a clear waiver of immunity in sections 118 and 304 of the
CAA. Because the discharge of pollution is no less harmful
when it is spewed from a federal facility, there is no refuge in
policy for courts that would undo those labors through adher-
ence to the obsolete doctrine of sovereign immunity.
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
("EIS") ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A HANGAR
AND BAGHOUSE FOR THE "IMPROVED COAL
TRANSPORT EXPERIMENT" ("ICTE"), IS NOT
SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR
COMPLIANCE WITH THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT ("NEPA"),
BECAUSE THAT EIS WAS NOT MANDATED BY
NEPA.
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, to encourage consideration of
the environment in agency decision making. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1277 (9th Cir.
1973). The provisions of NEPA, and the regulations promul-
gated by the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ"), es-
tablished under the Act to provide regulations for
implementing the Act's procedural provisions, require that
certain procedures be followed when an agency undertakes a
major federal action. Id. CRACT fully complied with these
requirements on June 26, 1993, when it issued its Finding of
No Significant Impact ("FONSI"). (R. at 4). NEPA mandates
an EIS only for cases in which a FONSI would be inappropri-
ate. In preparing an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") despite its finding of no significant impact, CRACT
voluntarily acted outside the requirements of NEPA.
CRACT's voluntary preparation of an EIS was therefore an
action strictly within the agency's own discretion, and as such
is not subject to judicial review for compliance with NEPA.
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A. CRACT met the requirements of both NEPA and the
CEQ regulations by preparing a Finding of No
Significant Impact.
NEPA requires that federal agencies prepare a
mandatory EIS for any "major Federal action[ ] significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C). Such a NEPA-mandated EIS includes a discus-
sion of "the environmental impact of the proposed action,"
§ 4332(2)(C)(i), and "alternatives to the proposed action."
§ 4332(2)(iii). The CEQ has set forth guidelines for determin-
ing when an agency should prepare a mandatory EIS. 40
C.F.R. § 1500-1508. First, the agency prepares an Environ-
mental Assessment ("EA") setting forth sufficient evidence
and analysis to determine whether to prepare an EIS.
§§ 1501.3; 1501.4(b)-(c); 1508.9. If the EA shows that an EIS
is not needed, the agency must prepare a FONSI.
§ 1501.4(e). A FONSI sets forth the reasons why the action
does not require an EIS. § 1508.13.
CRACT fulfilled NEPA's procedural requirements on
June 26, 1993, when it published a FONSI which properly
concluded "any operation of ICTE that complied with NUCAA
standards would have no significant impact on the human en-
vironment." (R. at 4.) Because it was never challenged, (R. at
5), that FONSI completed CRACT's obligations under NEPA.
CRACT's decision to prepare an EIS was therefore an en-
tirely voluntary act, implemented at its own discretion.
B. The EIS prepared by CRACT is not subject to judicial
review because it was prepared voluntarily and was
not mandated in any way by NEPA.
A court may only review an agency's action for compli-
ance with NEPA if that agency was compelled to follow
NEPA procedures. CRACT issued a FONSI, which was not
challenged by Sunpeace or anyone else, and CRACT was
therefore not compelled by NEPA to prepare an EIS. Sun-
peace now urges this court to review CRACT's voluntary EIS,
alleging that CRACT failed to discuss the "no action" alterna-
tive required by NEPA. Even if this allegation were true, the
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EIS prepared by CRACT is not subject to judicial review for
NEPA compliance, because CRACT's voluntary EIS was an
agency action which was entirely within its own discretion.
The voluntary preparation of an EIS does not subject an
agency to NEPA requirements. Proffitt v. United States Dep't
of Interior, 825 F. Supp. 159, 163 (W.D. Ky. 1993). In Proffitt,
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") voluntarily of-
fered assistance in preparing an EIS for a project which was
local, and was not a "major federal action." Id. The plaintiff
alleged that the EIS violated NEPA, and sought judicial re-
view of the adequacy of the EIS and an order requiring a new
EIS. Id. at 160-61. The Proffitt court found that the EPA's
voluntary assistance did not cause the local project to become
a major federal action, thus NEPA did not apply, and the
court therefore did not have jurisdiction to review the EIS.
Id. at 163. See also Village of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v.
Barnhart, 906 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1990)(holding that an EIS
prepared by the Federal Housing Administration on a local
bridge project was not required to meet NEPA).
CRACT's voluntary preparation of an EIS, which fol-
lowed its proper issuance of a FONSI pursuant to NEPA and
CEQ regulations, does not subject the agency to judicial re-
view of the adequacy of that EIS. Because the FONSI ful-
filled CRACT's obligations under NEPA, the agency went
beyond those obligations in preparing the voluntary EIS. The
Court may only review actions under NEPA which are re-
quired by that statute, and the only action which NEPA re-
quired of CRACT was the properly issued FONSI. Because
Sunpeace failed to challenge that FONSI, this Court lacks ju-
risdiction to hear a claim based on NEPA.
Courts lack jurisdiction to hear a cause of action based on
a voluntarily prepared EIS because NEPA does not provide
for an express or implied cause of action. Mountainbrook
Homeowners Assoc. v. Adams, 492 F. Supp. 521, 529 (W.D.
N.C. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1980). In Mountain-
brook, the plaintiffs sought to compel the Department of
Transportation to comply with a provision included in an EIS
the Department had prepared. Id. at 522. The court found
that NEPA contains neither an express nor implied cause of
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action to enforce provisions of -an EIS. Id. at 526-29. NEPA
requires federal agencies to prepare and submit an EIS for
major federal action significantly affecting the environment,
but NEPA does not create any federal rights in favor of pri-
vate parties. Id. at 528. Because NEPA does not create a
cause of action, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
claim. Id. See also Noe v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.
644 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that NEPA did not cre-
ate a private right of action to compel agency to adhere to
noise levels predicted by the agency's EIS).
The statement in dicta from Morgan v. Walter that an
EIS is always reviewable is not applicable in this case. 758 F.
Supp. 597, 602 (D. Idaho 1991) The parties in Morgan stipu-
lated to the agency preparing an EIS after litigation had be-
gun. Id. at 599. In the present case, however, CRACT
voluntarily prepared an EIS, not in response to litigation, but
merely to provide the public with additional information. (R.
at 4.) Unlike the parties in Morgan, the record here contains
no indication that CRACT agreed with any party to prepare
an EIS. On the contrary, the issuance of a FONSI serves as
notice under NEPA that no EIS is necessary.
Thus, the June 26, 1994 FONSI served as effective legal
notice CRACT had determined that an EIS for the ICTE han-
gar and baghouse project was not mandated by NEPA. By
failing to lodge a timely challenge to the FONSI, Sunpeace
and other third parties, indicated acquiescence to the volun-
tary EIS announced by CRACT. Finally, the stipulation in
Morgan reserved the right of the plaintiffs to challenge the
EIS that defendants prepared. 758 F. Supp. at 602. CRACT,
however, made no promise to reserve Sunpeace's right to
challenge its voluntary EIS. (R. at 4.)
Denying review of the adequacy of a voluntarily prepared
EIS will not prejudice public interest groups. Agencies in-
volve public interest groups at several stages of the NEPA
process by involving them in the study process and making
findings available to those affected. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848
F.2d 1068, 1094 (10th Cir. 1988). This involvement is re-
quired by the CEQ regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b), (e). In
addition, public interest groups may challenge an agency's
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compliance with NEPA at several junctions, including after
the publication of the FONSI. Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1094.
Sunpeace, however, admits that it missed its opportunity to
challenge the FONSI. (R. at 5.) The record reflects no reason
offered by Sunpeace for this failure.
NEPA is not intended to give citizen groups a general op-
portunity to air policy objections; that purpose is met by the
political process. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear
Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983). Sunpeace seeks to employ
NEPA inappropriately in its policy struggle to encourage a
search for jobs based on solar energy.
Subjecting a voluntarily prepared EIS to judicial scru-
tiny will diminish NEPA's utility in providing useful environ-
mental analysis. Cabinet Mtns. Wilderness v. Peterson 685
F.2d 678, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Cabinet Mtns., a federal
agency modified a proposal to completely compensate for any
adverse impacts to the environment. Id. at 680-81. The
plaintiff sought a court order requiring that an EIS be com-
pleted. Id. at 681. The Cabinet Mtns. court found that an EIS
was not required, and that to require an EIS would under-
mine the administrative process. Id. at 684.
Sunpeace cannot be unfairly prejudiced by the absence of
judicial review over an EIS that CRACT was completely free
to forego. Rather, it would seriously undermine both the pur-
poses of NEPA, and agency administrative process, if volun-
tary environmental documents such as the EIS prepared by
CRACT were subject to judicial review. Sunpeace had a full
and fair opportunity to seek judicial review of the FONSI on
the ICTE baghouse and hangar project and failed to take ad-
vantage of this opportunity. If this Court now allows judicial
review of CRACT's voluntarily prepared EIS, it will under-
mine the administrative decision making power that Con-
gress gave to the agency. Such judicial review of voluntary
agency action will discourage agencies from going the extra
mile, above and beyond NEPA's formal requirements, in the
way that CRACT has done in this case.
If courts choose to second-guess voluntary agency actions
whenever they approach the realm of NEPA, the inevitable
result will be that agencies will do no more than what is
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strictly required under NEPA. This would limit public access
to information on federal actions not technically covered by
NEPA, but having environmental implications of interest to
the public. If agencies are discouraged from voluntarily pre-
paring environmental documents, the public will simply lose
the opportunity to participate in many such government ac-
tions affecting the environment.
C. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a voluntarily
prepared Environmental Impact Statement is not
subject to review, because it is prepared solely at
the discretion of the agency Act.
The APA provides a presumption of judicial review of
agency actions except in two instances. Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 596 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1979). The first exception
applies if the agency's statutory mandate expressly precludes
judicial review. APA § 701(a)(1). It is well established that
NEPA does not expressly prohibit judicial review under this
first exception. Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law Adapta-
tions From NEPA's Progeny, 16 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 207, 211-
12 (1992). The second exception applies if the "agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law." APA § 701(a)(2).
The Supreme Court has defined this agency discretion excep-
tion as applying when there is no meaningful standard to
judge the agency's discretion or, in other words, when there is
no law to apply. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
The voluntary preparation of an EIS by CRACT falls within
this agency discretion exception.
The lack of formal guidelines precludes judicial review of
an agency decision. Ness Inv. Corp. v. United States Dep't. of
Agric., 512 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1975). In Ness, the Forest Ser-
vice denied a special use permit. The court found that
neither the authorizing statute nor the applicable regulations
offered standards for the agency's decision. Because there
was no law to apply, the denial of the permit was not judi-
cially reviewable. See also Methow Valley Citizens Council v.
Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
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there is now law to apply, because the Forest Service's new
regulations now impose specific obligations when issuing a
special use permit).
NEPA does not provide formal guidelines for agency ac-
tions taken after NEPA procedures have been met. CRACT
met the obligations of NEPA when it issued the FONSI. Had
Sunpeace sought review of that FONSI, there would be law to
apply, because NEPA and CEQ regulations set forth guide-
lines for issuing a FONSI. Sunpeace, however, did not seek
judicial review of the FONSI. Instead, Sunpeace urges the
court to now review CRACT's voluntary EIS, effectively ask-
ing the court to saddle CRACT with additional procedures
not required by any law or regulation.
Courts may not require additional procedures on agen-
cies. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-48 (1978).
The APA and NEPA provide the statutory minimum proce-
dures. Id. The agency may, of course, utilize additional pro-
cedures at its own discretion. Id. But, as long as the agency
has met the statutory minimum procedure, the court may not
overturn the proceeding on procedural grounds. Id. at 548.
In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court reviewed the appel-
late court's decision to strike down the Atomic Energy com-
mission's granting of a license. Id. The Supreme Court
found, however, that the lower court's scrutiny of the entire
record and its finding that the commission had failed to pro-
vide "genuine opportunities to participate" was in error. Id.
The lower court's finding was improper because, in effect, it
held that the Commission's procedures were inadequate de-
spite the fact that those procedures met both the APA and
NEPA. Id. at 541-42. The Court's decision was supported
not only by the legislative history of the APA, but also by pol-
icy reasons. Id. at 545-48. First, by prohibiting courts from
proscribing additional procedures, the APA provides some
predictability in judicial review. Id. at 546. Second, by re-
stricting the availability of judicial review, the rule preserves
the advantages of the procedures set forth by NEPA. Id. at
547. A policy allowing broader judicial review would compel
agencies to utilize a full range of procedures solely to protect
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themselves, even when those procedures are not required.
This would waste the agencies' time and resources and would
allow citizen's groups to in effect have a veto power. Ferester,
16 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. at 216.
D. Even if the voluntary EIS prepared by CRACT were
reviewable for compliance with NEPA, it was clearly
sufficient, because the record establishes that the
agency took a hard look at all reasonable
alternatives.
1. The Court may only consider whether the agency
took a hard look at the reasonable alternatives
and may not apply the Court's own judgment
regarding the choice of those alternatives.
The preparation of an EIS serves two purposes; 1) the EIS
aids the agency's decision whether to proceed with a project
by providing disclosure of the project's environmental conse-
quences and 2) the EIS provides the public with information
and the opportunity to participate. Oregon Envtl. Council v.
Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987). To meet these
goals, NEPA requires that agencies consider alternatives to
the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii); 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.14. CEQ regulations require that agencies "rigorously
explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives,"
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a), including the "no action" alternative,
§ 1502.14(d). In reviewing the adequacy of an agency's dis-
cussion of alternatives, courts apply the rule of reason, which
asks whether the agency reasonably discussed the significant
probable environmental consequences. Oregon Envtl. Coun-
cil, 817 F.2d at 492. The court may not hold an EIS invalid
on the basis of inconsequential or technical defects. Id.
2. The EIS prepared by CRACT satisfies all NEPA
requirements, because the agency need only
consider alternatives reasonably related to the
purposes of its project.
Although a court will invalidate an EIS which fails to
consider a viable alternative, an agency need only consider
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reasonable alternatives. Id. at 815. The agency need only
consider alternatives reasonably related to the purposes of
the project, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14, not every remote possibility,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hughes, 7 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20785, 20788 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In
Natural Resources Defense Council, the court considered the
adequacy of an EIS prepared by the DOI when establishing a
new coal leasing program. Id. at 20785. The court stated
that two types of alternatives must be considered: 1) the no
action alternative, and 2) the type of system alternative. Id.
at 20788. The no action alternative's purpose is to answer
the question, "Should the new program be undertaken at all?"
Id. at 20788-89. The "no action" alternative was not designed
to consider shutting down the coal leasing program all to-
gether. See Id. In fact, no reported cases discuss, as a re-
quired alternative, shutting down a facility already in
operation. This view is explicitly supported by the CEQ. In
its document answering the forty most asked questions about
NEPA, the CEQ specifically stated that "no action" does not
mean shutting down an ongoing program. 46 Fed. Reg.
18026, 18027 (1981). Despite Sunpeace's assertion that the
"no action" alternative was not addressed, according to the
above CEQ document, the "no action" alternative would be to
not construct the hangar and baghouse. This alternative was
addressed by CRACT's voluntary EIS. (R. at 4.)
Furthermore, shutting down the ICTE facility is not
within the scope of the agency action proposed by CRACT.
This agency action is restricted to the proposal to construct a
baghouse and hanger for the ICTE facility. The only alterna-
tives reasonably related to this action must address the issue
of whether to go forward with the proposed construction.
Whether ICTE is a worthy program is a policy decision, and
is therefore entirely beyond the scope of any EIS discussing
construction of the baghouse and hangar. This would be true
even if the EIS were mandated by NEPA. CRACT, therefore,
cannot be required to include shutting down the ICTE pro-
gram as an alternative in its EIS discussing the construction
of its baghouse and hangar.
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The purpose of the baghouse and hanger project is solely
to bring the ICTE facility into compliance with NUCAA stan-
dards. The EIS prepared by CRACT discussed the only two
alternatives that are reasonably related to this purpose.
First, the EIS discussed the alternative of building the
baghouse and hanger. Second, the EIS discussed the "no ac-
tion" alternative of not building the baghouse and hangar,
and instead meeting NUCAA standards by reducing the vol-
ume of the ICTE program. No other reasonable alternatives
exist. The alternative urged by Sunpeace, that CRACT shut
down the ICTE program, is entirely beyond the scope of the
project proposed by the agency. That alternative is therefore
unreasonable, and not required under NEPA procedures.
3. The alternative of shutting down ICTE, now urged
by Sunpeace, is unreasonable even if it were
related to the purposes of the baghouse and
hangar project proposed by CRACT.
Even if the alternative of shutting down ICTE were
within the scope of the proposed baghouse and hangar pro-
ject, it would still be unreasonable. The CRACT facility em-
ploys 800 people in Cathertown, and is the principal
employer in the area. (R. at 2.) Additionally, CRACT's re-
search activities, including ICTE, are important to the coal
industry, which is New Union's major industry. Id. Agencies
are not required "to elevate environmental concerns over
other appropriate considerations," but instead, are required
to "take a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences
before taking a major action." Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.
NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). Shutting down ICTE is not
only a policy decision beyond the scope of judicial review, it
would adversely affect the people of New Union, and poten-
tially devastate the economy of Cathertown.
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/5
MEASURING BRIEF
4. The Court should uphold CRACT's decision not to
consider shutting down ICTE as an alternative in
the EIS, unless that decision was arbitrary and
capricious.
Even if the agency could have reasonably decided to dis-
cuss the alternative of shutting down ICTE, the court would
be compelled to uphold CRACT's decision to omit that alter-
native, unless CRACT's decision was arbitrary and capri-
cious. Although CEQ regulations require that an agency
discuss the reasons for eliminating an alternative from de-
tailed study, § 1502.14(a), courts cannot fly-speck an agency's
compliance with NEPA. Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman,
817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987). An EIS that allows the
agency to make an informed decision will not be held insuffi-
cient on the basis of inconsequential, technical defects. Id.
The reviewing court must assure only that the agency took a
"hard look" at the environmental consequences of its decision.
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390,410 n.21 (1976). The EIS
prepared by CRACT the agency to make an informed decision
to construct the baghouse and hangar for the ICTE facility,
and would not be insufficient even if it were reviewable for
NEPA compliance.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District
Court of New Union holding the Department of Interior's
Coal Research Activity liable for civil penalties assessed
under the New Union Clean Air Act should be affirmed, and
the decision of that District Court subjecting CRACT's volun-
tary Environmental Impact Statement to judicial review
should be reversed.
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APPENDIX A
Resource Conservation & Recovery Act (RCRA)
RCRA § 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 - Federal Facilities
Provision
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Govern-
ment... shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements, both substantive
and procedural (including any requirement for permits or re-
porting or any provisions or injunctive relief and such sanc-
tions as may be imposed by a court to enforce such relief),
respecting control and abatement of solid waste or hazardous
waste disposal in the same manner, and to the same extent,
as any person is subject to such requirements .... Neither the
United States, nor any agent, employee, or officer thereof,
shall be immune or exempt from any process or sanction of
any State or Federal Court with respect to the enforcement of
any such injunctive relief (emphasis added). This cites to
RORA's section 6001 before its amendment by the Federal
Facilities Compliance Act of 1992. Note that this Federal Fa-
cilities section mentions "sanctions" only within the confines
of enforcing injunctive relief.
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APPENDIX B
Clean Water Act
Clean Water Act § 313, 33 U.S.C. § 1323
(a) Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Govern-
ment (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or
(2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in
the discharge or runoff of pollutants, and each officer, agent
or employee thereof in the performance of his official duties,
shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, inter-
state, and local requirements, administrative authority, and
process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement
of water pollution in the same manner, and to the same ex-
tent as any nongovernmental entity including the payment of
reasonable service charges. The preceding sentence shall ap-
ply (A) to any requirement whether substantive or procedural
(including any recordkeeping or reporting requirement, any
requirement respecting permits and any other requirement,
whatsoever), (B) to the exercise of any Federal, State, or local
administrative authority, and (C) to any process and sanc-
tion, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in
any other manner. This subsection shall apply notwithstand-
ing any immunity of such agencies, officers, agents, or em-
ployees under any law or rule of law. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prevent any department, agency, or in-
strumentality of the Federal Government, or any officer,
agent, or employee thereof in the performance of his official
duties, from removing to the appropriate Federal district
court any proceeding to which the department, agency, or in-
strumentality or officer, agent, or employee thereof is subject
pursuant to this section, and any such proceeding may be re-
moved in accordance with section 1441 et seq. of Title 28. No
officer, agent, or employee of the United States shall be per-
sonally liable for any civil penalty arising from the perform-
ance of his official duties, for which he is not otherwise liable,
and the United States shall be liable only for those civil pen-
alties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or lo-
cal court to enforce an order or the process of such court...
(emphasis added).
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APPENDIX C
Clean Air Act
Clean Air Act § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 - Federal
Facilities Provision
(a) COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS, ADMINISTRATIVE AU-
THORITY, PROCESS, AND SANCTIONS RESPECTING CONTROL AND
ABATEMENT OF AIR POLLUTION
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the ex-
ecutive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Gov-
ernment (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility,
or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result,
in the discharge or air pollutants, and each officer, agent, or
employee thereof, shall be subject to, and comply with, all
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, adminis-
trative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the
control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner,
and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. The
preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement
whether substantive or procedural (including any record-
keeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respect-
ing permits and any other requirement whatsoever), (B) to
the exercise of any Federal, State, or local administrative au-
thority, and (C) to any process and sanction, whether en-
forced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any other
manner. This subsection shall apply notwithstanding any
immunity of such agencies, officers, agents, or employees
under any law or rule of law. No officer, agent, or employee of
the United States shall be personally liable for any civil pen-
alty for which he is not otherwise liable....
Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 - Citizens Suit
Provision
(a) AUTHORITY TO BRING CIVIL ACTION; JURISDICTION Except
as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf -
(1) dentagainst any person, (including (i) the United
States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumental-
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ity or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation
under the chapter of (B) an order issued by the Admin-
istrator of a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation,
(2) dentagainst the Administrator where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator, or
(3) dentagainst any person who proposes to construct or
constructs any new or modified major emitting facility
without a permit required under part C of subchapter I
of this chapter (relating to significant deterioration of
air quality) or part D of subchapter I of the chapter (re-
lating to nonattainment) or who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of any condition of such permit. The district
courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties,
to enforce such an emission standard or limitation, or
such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform
such act or duty, as the case may be.
(e) NONRESTRICTION OF OTHER RIGHTS
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any per-
son (or class of persons) may have under any statute or com-
mon law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or
limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against
the Administrator or a State agency). Nothing in this section
or in any other law of the United States shall be construed to
prohibit, exclude, or restrict any State, local, or interstate au-
thority from -
(1) dentbringing any enforcement action or obtaining any
judicial remedy or sanction in any State or local court,
or
(2) dentbringing any administrative enforcement action or
obtaining any administrative remedy or sanction in
any State or local administrative agency, department
or instrumentality,
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against the United States, any department, agency, or instru-
mentality thereof, or any officer, agent, or employee thereof
under State or local law respecting control and abatement of
air pollution. For provisions requiring compliance by the
United States, departments, agencies, instrumentalities, of-
ficers, agents, and employees in the same manner as nongov-
ernmental entities, see section 7418 of this title.... Clean Air
Act § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 7602 - General Definitions Provision
When used in this Act -... (e) The term "person" includes an
individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, mu-
nicipality, political subdivision of a State, and any agency, de-
partment, or instrumentality of the United States and any
officer, agent, or employee thereof.
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APPENDIX D
Congressional Record
Comments of Rep. Dingell for the Conf. Rep. on H.R.
2194, Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992
Mr. Dingell: Mr Speaker, Federal facilities are among this
country's worst environmental offenders. Their long his-
tory of noncompliance with this country's environmental
laws, particularly the hazardous waste management re-
quirements under RCRA, has resulted in numerous law-
suits by States against the Federal Government seeking to
compel compliance with the law and remediation of the se-
vere environmental problems they have cause. This bill re-
affirms Congress' original intent that Federal facilities not
only must comply with all of the procedural and substan-
tive requirements of our Federal and State hazardous
waste laws, but they, like everyone else, are also subject to
fines and penalties for violations of those laws. In doing so,
Congress is responding to the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in United States Department of Energy versus Ohio et
al., and making the waiver of sovereign immunity as clear
and unambiguous as humanly possible. It is our fervent
hope that the Supreme Court will heed Justice Byron
White and not resort to "ingenuity to create ambiguity"
that simply does not exist in this statute. (emphasis
added).
Cong. Rec. H9135 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1992)(statement of Rep.
Dingell).
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APPENDIX E
National Environmental Policy Act
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42
U.S.C. § 4332
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest
extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public
laws of the United States shall be interpreted and ad-
ministered in accordance with the policies set forth in
this Act, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall -
(C)
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on -
(i) denitthe environmental impact of the proposed
action,
(ii) dentany adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,
(iii) dentalternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) dentthe relationship between local short-term
uses of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) dentany irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented.
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APPENDIX F
Council on Environmental Quality Regulations
40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 ALTERNATIvEs INCLUDING THE PRO-
POSED ACTION.
This section is the heart of the environmental impact
statement. Based on the information and analysis
presented in the sections on the Affected Environment
(§ 1502.15) and the environmental consequences
(§ 1502.16), it should present the environmental impacts
of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form,
thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear ba-
sis for choice among options by the decisionmaker and
the public. In this section agencies shall:
(a) Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reason-
able alternatives, and for alternatives which were elim-
inated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons
for their having been eliminated.
(b) Devote substantial treatment to each alternative con-
sidered in detail including the proposed action so that
reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits.
(c) Include reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdic-
tion of the lead agency.
(d) Include the alternative of no action.
(e) Identify the agency's preferred alternative or alterna-
tives, if one or more exists, in the draft statement and
identify such alternative in the final statement unless
another law prohibits the expression of such a
preference.
(f) Include appropriate mitigation measures not already
included in the proposed action or alternatives.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.13
FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT
Finding of no significant impact means a document by a Fed-
eral agency briefly presenting the reasons why an action not
otherwise excluded (§ 1508.4), will not have a significant ef-
fect on the human environment and for which an environ-
mental impact statement therefore will not be prepared. It
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shall include the environmental assessment or a summary of
it and shall note any other environmental documents related
to it (§ 1501.7(a)(5)). If the assessment is included, the find-
ing need not repeat any of the discussion in the assessment
but may incorporate it by reference.
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